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German civil law system and our own common law system.
These are not merely differences in procedure, or even
differences internal to the law. Legal systems reflect their
countries' larger systems of political authority, and Germany's
larger system has historically been bureaucratic and
hierarchical rather than decentralized.73 German judges are
neither political appointees nor elected officials: they are
Beamters, civil servants, who do not belong to the bar, who
begin their careers directly out of law school, and who are
gradually promoted as they gain experience and please their
superiors. As with other civil servants, bureaucratic
conscientiousness all too readily takes the place of bureaucratic
conscience.
I began with this question: does the rule of law immunize
and safeguard jurists from evil-doing or from the voice of
conscience? My answer, I fear, is "more the latter than the
former." And this for three reasons, only one of which is
specific to Germany. That is the point I just mentioned, that
German judges work in a hierarchical rather than a
decentralized system of authority. The other reasons, however,
are the psychology of role-identification, and the broad form of
legal positivism with which it corresponds entirely too well.
Positivists understand quite well that legal validity is no
talisman against evil; what they did not anticipate was how
little evil might trouble the conscience of a judge.
PROFESSOR RUTI G. TEITELO4
I would like to build on what's been said. We have been
looking largely at the role of judges during periods of
persecution, and I would like to continue the story as to
Germany by looking at three judges to see how post-Nazi
judges and post-communist judges have interpreted the
jurisprudence in the cases from the Nazi period. What do these
decisions tell us about how these judges confronted the
"' See generally MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE
AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986).
74 Professor of Law, New York Law School; Senior Schell Fellow, Yale Law
School.
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dilemma? How do they resolve the question of the conflict
between evil laws and their role as judges? Are there any
lessons?
Let us begin with the most recent (post-communist)
decision, which begins at the Berlin Wall in 1989. Just before
reunification, East German border guards shot two East
Germans trying to escape across the border. These border
guards were prosecuted in 1991, and the question confronted
by the Berlin State Court was whether these defendants had a
defense in former East German (GDR) law.75 One might have
thought the Unification Treaty bound these judges, because, in
common with the rule of law in all democracies, the treaty
stated that the law that applied to these cases should be the
scene of the crime law.76 Thus, the question for the judges
was whether to apply GDR law and validate the defense that
they were just following the law prohibiting unlawful border
crossings.
The court posed the dilemma exactly as we are considering
it here, saying the question was whether the written (i.e.,
former) law was rightful, and that the issue seemed to be a
dilemma of law versus justice.77 What is interesting about
this decision is that it takes us back close to fifty years, to the
post-World War II German judiciary, because the court looks
back to other periods of persecution and post-persecution and
declares that it is guided by the post-war German judiciary
evaluating Nazi law, and so the cases that they look at are
(again) cases of collaborators.7 8 One in particular concerned a
woman who evidently had a bad marriage, and, using the Nazi
laws as an enabling opportunity for judicial murder, denounced
her husband, who was incarcerated. She was prosecuted after
the war for having done that. Now, her husband was arrested
but not killed, and in her defense she relied on Nazi law, and
said that this was the law she was following.71 In confronting
" See Ruti G. Teitel, supra note 24; Kif A. Adams, What is just?: The Rule of
Law and Natural Law in the Trials of Former East German Border Guards, 29
STAN. J. INT'L L. 271 (1993).
7 Teitel, supra note 24, at 243.
7 Teitel, supra note 24, at 241.
78 Teitel, supra note 24, at 243. In rejecting the guards' defenses, it appears
that the court did not follow the treaty. Id.
7' See Note, German Citizen who Pursuant to Nazi Statute Infored on
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those laws in the 1950s, the German judiciary said that there
has to be a way of evaluating laws that are unjust; in "extreme
cases" there must be a possibility to weigh justice more highly
than legal certainty." So again, we see the dilemma between
formal law and justice; between the rule of law as security
versus what is just.
To return to the post-communist court: it held itself guided
by the postwar cases, and in a potentially controversial
analogy said both involve "extreme cases."3 ' Like the
collaborator cases, the border guard action was an "extreme
case," and in these "extreme cases," justice is more important
than certainty. 2 Now, it is worthy to note, that unlike the
other cases discussed on the panel that occurred during
persecution, here the act of validating the evil law would imply
an act of clemency, a defense: the border guards would go free.
This then is the reverse of those other cases, where validating
the law means a conviction. Coming up in the reverse, these
cases invert the usual case, but consider the same problem of
to what extent to validate evil laws.
Now, I would like to explore the reasoning of these two
courts: how they came to these decisions and to see what we
might draw from their reconciliation of the competing values
that we are considering here. The first effort at reconciliation
is the 1950 German judiciary's appeal to principles of natural
law. This was previously discussed by David Luban. This
appeal is illustrated by Gustav Radbruch's conversion. In his
movement from positivism to natural law, Radbruch declared
that law has to yield to justice. Following Radbruch, much of
the reasoning in these cases relies on natural justice
principles. In addition to this reasoning, in other reconciling
determinations these principles are codified in international
legal norms, adopting a concept which was very vivid at the
time in the 1950s. Certainly Nuremberg plays a role here,
along with the UN, the Geneva Convention, and the growth of
international law in general, with its proposition that
international law trumps national law, no matter how evil. So
Husband for Expressing Anti-Nazi Sentiments Convicted under Another German
Statute in Effect at Time of Act, 64 HARV. L. REV 1005 (1951).
" Teitel, supra note 24, at 243.
Si Teitel, supra note 24, at 243.
'2 Teitel, supra note 24, at 243.
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this already suggests an understanding that there is law and
there is law: there is more than one law.
Let me pursue this thread. The post-communist court,
considering the dilemma of the tension between morality
versus justice, doesn't leave it at that, but instead introduces a
very interesting way to think about the way judges might
confront this dilemma. The court suggested reasons why the
border guards should not have thought of the border protection
law as law, even though it was settled law. In particular, the
court discussed the lack of transparency: the fact of a news
blackout whenever there were shootings; soldiers were warned
not to speak; they were often transferred; the names were
erased from the records of whom might have been shot; when
foreign dignitaries came, there was an understanding that the
shootings had to stop. Lastly and most intriguingly the court
added to its decision a fact about one of the four defendants,
who had shot one of the people crossing the border. The
defendant had never worn his medal of merit for the shooting
in public because he knew that there was a strong likelihood of
insult and attacks, followed by recriminations by the GDR. The
point that the court draws from all of this is that we are all
aware of the difference between written law and law. Thus, the
court says "Justice and humanity were portrayed as ideals also
in the then GDR;"' and since these ideals as to justice were
known, many of the inhabitants of the GDR would have
considered these written laws unjust.
Here, there are several points. One is the idea of
transparency. Part of the rule of law is the idea that for a law
to be valid, it has to be written, it has to be published, and it
has to be applied generally.' Certainly that was understood.
But beyond that, the court points to the importance of public
opinion and perceptions of law and legal culture. The court
considers if there was a social consensus at the time and if
there was a breakdown in consensus on whether these laws
were just. The court suggests that the judges could draw upon
these considerations in their interpretation of these laws. The
court's reasoning is relevant because it suggests a way out of
the positivism-natural law dilemma as it is ordinarily framed
8' Teitel, supra note 24, at 241.
84 See also LON L. FULLER, THE MoRAirY OF THE LAW 39 (1964).
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because it suggests that the fact that the law is written is only
one element of what makes law positive, and that there are
others, such as a broader understanding of publication and
public perception.
I think this decision helps to explain how law is considered
in transitional periods, and relatedly, how we evaluate the
uses of law in periods of totalitarian rule. In a totalitarian
country, we might very well expect a gap between the law as it
is written and the people's understanding of the law. Indeed,
when we see the commencing of this divide, where contempt
for written law or for lawyers begins, it may signal the onset of
a new period. The danger sign is clear: lack of integration
between the public perception of law as lawful and the law as
written. That these attitudes are on the rise in our country is
rather troubling.
I want to conclude by suggesting that we can enrich our
debate about judgment on tyranny. The real question I suggest
is not the issue of the competing claims of morality versus the
duty to follow laws, nor the related question of the way we
frame and question these claims, but what law do judges
follow? What may well be most important about these
decisions is that they remind us of laws multiplicity. In
functioning democracies, as well as periods where totalitarian
countries are in transition towards more liberal regimes, there
begins to be a multiplicity of sources of the rule of law: natural
law as well as international law, societal consensus, and
constitutional law. These are all constraints on the judge's
interpretation of statutory law, the law of the sovereign, the
law we are considering here. I think this multiplicity helped to
advance the breakdown in the last wave of transitions: In a
period of technological change, we live more and more with
interconnected legal systems, and there is an inherent
multiplicity and coexistence of legal values and norms. This
interconnectedness helped usher in the collapse of repressive
regimes and the last wave of transition. Finally, recognizing
multiple sources of law allows us to see the importance of the
public sphere in shaping the understanding of the law, as well
as what law judges follow.
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